When the AAG protocol was first introduced, braid groups were proposed as platform group. However, there are studies that successful attack AAG with braid groups, one main attack method is the length-based attack. Searching for a new platform for AAG, Garber, Kahrobaei, and Lam studied polycyclic groups generated by number field and concluded that they are resistant against the length-based attack. Inspired by this result, we ask whether other type of polycyclic groups can be used as platform for AAG. In this paper, we discuss the use of Heisenberg groups, a type of polycyclic group, as a platform group for AAG by submitting them to one of AAG's major attacks, the length-based attack.
After the introduction of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol in 1999 [1] , it has been studied extensively with different groups as platform, for example, using braid groups by Ko et al. [2] , using Thompson's group by Shpilrain and Ushakov [3] . Different attack methods have also been applied to AAG [4] , [5] , [6] .
One of the major attack methods of the AAG protocol is the length-based attack (LBA), originated with Hughes and Tannenbaum [7] , whose paper provided an example in braid groups, together with remark on the importance of the length function. Garber et al. studied the infeasibility of the length based attack with a choice of length function [8] , but then introduced a variant of it using memory which succeeded in breaking AAG for braid group [9] . Myasnikov and Ushakov also studied the lengthbased attack for braid group and provided several variants with which it was possible to break AAG [10] . Similar attack was implemented against system based on the Thompson group [11] In 2004, Eick and Kahrobaei suggested using polycyclic groups as platform group for the AAG key-exchange protocol [12] . This idea was realized by Garber, Kahrobaei, and Lam [13] . In that paper, Research of Delaram Kahrobaei was partially supported by the Office of Naval Research grant N000141210758 and by PSC-CUNY grant from the CUNY research foundation, as well as the City Tech foundation.
several variants of LBA were tested on an AAG implementation using polycyclic groups generated from number field. The result suggests that this type of polycyclic group is resistant to the lengthbased attack. Taking inspiration from this, we want to study the Heisenberg group as platform group for AAG. We use the variants of the length-based attack presented in [13] to conduct tests on an implementation of the Heisenberg group.
Furthermore, the conjugacy search problem has been used for several other cryptographic protocols, such as the non-commutative Diffie-Hellman key exchange [2] , the non-commutative El-Gamal key exchange [14] , the non-abelian Cramer-Shoup key exchange [15] and the non-commutative digital signatures [16] . The length-based attack can be applied to all of these protocols, hence testing different groups against it and collecting data about parameters that make them resistant to LBA is important, not just for the implementation of AAG but also of other protocols.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section I, we introduce the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol, in Section II, there is a short review of polycyclic groups and the construction of Heisenberg group; in Section III, we talk about the length-based attack; and in Section IV, we detail the experiments, results and conclusion that we made.
I. THE ANSHEL-ANSHEL-GOLDFELD KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL AND HEISENBERG GROUP
In this section, we give a short introduction to the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol. As usual, we use Alice and Bob as two parties who want to communicate over an insecure channel. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol works as follows:
Let G = g 1 , . . . , g n | R be a finitely presented group with generators g 1 , . . . , g n and relation set R. First, Alice chooses, as her public set, a = (a 1 , . . . , a N1 ) where a i ∈ G and Bob chooses, as
They both publish their sets. Alice then chooses her private key A = a ε1 s1 . . . a ε L s L where a si ∈ a and ε i ∈ {±1}. Bob also chooses his private key
and sends it to Bob. Bob also computes a i = B −1 a i B for all a i ∈ a and sends it to Alice. Now the shared secret key is K = A −1 B −1 AB. Alice can computes this key by
Thus, the security of AAG is based on the assumption that the subgroup-restricted simultaneous conjugacy search problem is hard.
II. POLYCYCLIC GROUPS
In this section, we give a short review of polycyclic groups and discuss how we generate Heisenberg groups.
A. Polycyclic groups
Recall that G is a polycyclic group if it has a polycyclic series, i.e., a subnormal series
with non-trivial cyclic factors. The polycyclic generating sequence of G is the n-tuple (g 1 , . . . , g n ) such that
Every polycyclic group has a finite presentation of the form:
Using induction, we see that each element of G defined by this presentation can be uniquely written as g = g e1
1 . . . g en n with e i ∈ Z for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 0 ≤ e i < r i for i ∈ I. This is the normal form of an element. If every element in the group can be presented uniquely in normal form, then the polycyclic presentation is consistent. Note that every polycyclic group has a consistent polycyclic presentation. Thanks to the existence of normal form, the word problem in polycyclic groups can be solved efficiently, this is an important requirement of a platform group for AAG.
The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group is the
This number is invariant of the chosen polycyclic sequence.
For more details regarding polycyclic groups, see [17] , [18] .
B. Heisenberg groups
Heisenberg groups have been studied widely from the point of view of analysis, geometry, physics, etc [19] . From the group theory point of view, they are often used as examples of nilpotent groups. For more discussion of Heisenberg groups and their group-theoretic properties, see [20] .
The three dimensional Heisenberg group, often known as the Heisenberg group, is the group of 3×3 upper triangular matrices of the form ⎛
The nilpotency for the Heisenberg group is easy to see, making it a polycyclic group. Generalizing the Heisenberg group, we have higher dimension Heisenberg groups, H 2n+1 , n ≥ 1, n ∈ Z. As matrix group, they are groups of dimension n + 2 matrices of the form ⎛
The calculation for the commutator subgroup and the center of H 2n+1 is straightforward, showing that it is also a nilpotent group, thus, also polycyclic. The Hirsch length of H 2n+1 is 2n + 1.
The Heisenberg groups of higher dimension H 2n+1 also has presentation a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 
This presentation makes it easy to encode H 2n+1 in a computer system. In fact, the GAP (Groups, Algorithms, Programming) system [21] can compute H 2n+1 as part of the polycyclic package by Eick and Nickel [22] . Using this implementation of H 2n+1 , we study the Heisenberg groups as platform group for the AAG key-exchange protocol, in particular, under the length-based attack, one of the major attacks for AAG.
III. LENGTH BASED ATTACK A. Overview of the length-based attack
The length-based attack is a probabilistic attack against AAG, with the goal of finding Alice's (or Bob's) private key. It is based on the idea that a conjugation of the right element will decrease the length of the captured package. Using notation of Section I, the captured package is
If we conjugate b with elements from the group a 1 , . . . , a N1 and the resulting tuple has decreased length, then we know we have found a conjugating factor. The process of conjugation is then repeated with the decreased length tuple until another conjugating factor is found. The process ends when the conjugated captured package is the same as b = (b 1 , . . . , b N2 ) , which is public knowledge. Then the conjugate can be recovered by reversing the sequence of conjugating factors. The idea of the length-based attack can be summarized as going from bottom to top of the tower:
For more details on the length-based attack, see [23] , [10] .
B. LBA with memory 2
In [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [13] , several variations of the length-based attack are given. Here we recall Algorithm 4 of [13] which we use in our experiments.
In this algorithm, S holds M tuples every round and all elements of S are conjugated, but only the M smallest conjugated tuples (by total length) are added back into S. Because we are adding back M smallest tuples and not just one single element, we avoid the problem of the same element being removed and added time and again. Moreover, this method of saving several tuples, not just the ones whose length decreased after conjugation, keeps us away from problems generated by peaks. Here, for the stopping condition, we use a time-out that is defined by the user. if c a ε i = b then output inverse of xa ε i and stop 7 :
end for 9:
After finished all conjugations, sort S by the first element of every tuple 10: Copy the smallest M elements into S and delete the rest of S 11: end while 12: Otherwise, output FAIL
IV. RESULTS
As a test of the resilience of polycyclic groups against the length-based attack, Garber, Kahrobaei, and Lam [13] implemented four variants of the length-based attack and performed experiments against all four variants. The conclusion was that Algorithm 4, LBA with Memory 2, was the most effective. Hence, in this study, we use Algorithm 4 for all of our experiments.
We performed several sets of tests, all of which were run on an Intel Core I7 quad-core 2.0GHz computer with 12GB of RAM, running Ubuntu version 12.04 with GAP version 4.5 and 10GB of memory allowance. In all these tests, the Heisenberg group G with 2n generators having Hirsch length h(G) = 2n + 1 is generated using GAP with the Polycyclic group package [22] . The size of Alices and Bobs public sets are both N 1 = N 2 = 20, the memory used is M = 1000 and the time-out is 30 minutes.
To see the effect of element length, we fix the key length L = 10, but changes the range of random element between [L 1 , L 2 ] = [10, 13] and [20, 23] . The result is as follows: n h(G) [L 1 , L 2 ] = [10, 13] Clearly, increasing the key length reduced the success rate dramatically. What is interesting is that the same algorithm, together with the same parameters, when applied on polycyclic group of Hirsch length 10 generated with number field as in [13] gave 0% success rate. However, it is clear that we need different parameters to ensure low success rates. We turn the key length to L = 50, let length of random element be [L 1 , L 2 ] = [40, 43] . Note that this is the parameters used in [10] , which succeeded in breaking AAG with braid group. n h (G) L=50  6  13  0%  7  15  0%  8 17 1%
As expected, this produces almost zero success rate. We recommend this as parameters for Heisenberg group as platform for AAG. Finally, as a stress test, we increase the timeout to 4 hours instead of the usual 30 minutes per test. Because of the long time-out, we only do 50 tests each, instead of 100 test batch as in the previous experiments. The element length is kept at [L 1 , L 2 ] = [20, 23] , key length is L = 20. n h (G) L=20  6  13  3%  7  15  4%  8 17 7%
Even at such long time-out, success rate is quite modest, given that the key length we use here is quite small. With these results, we conclude that the Heisenberg groups is resistant against LBA and can be possibily used as platform for the AAG protocol given the correct parameters. This strengthens the idea to use polycyclic group as possible platform for AAG in particular, and non-commutative cryptographic primitives in general.
